This document improves the security of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) in two ways. First, it specifies how "prooftypes" can establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream. Second, it describes how to securely delegate a source domain to a derived domain, which is especially important in multi-tenanted environments.
Introduction
The need to establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream arises in both client-to-server and server-to-server communication using the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [RFC6120]. Because XMPP servers are typically identified by DNS domain names, a client or peer server needs to verify the identity of a server to which it connects.
To date, such verification has been established based on information obtained from the Domain Name System (DNS), the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), or similar sources. In relation to such associations, this document does the following:
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1. Generalizes the model currently in use so that additional prooftypes can be defined 2. Provides a basis for modernizing some prooftypes to reflect progress in underlying technologies such as DNS Security [RFC4033] 3. Describes the flow of operations for establishing a domain name association (DNA)
This document also provides guidelines for secure delegation. The need for secure delegation arises because the process for resolving the domain name of an XMPP service into the IP address at which an XML stream will be negotiated (see [RFC6120] ) can involve delegation of a source domain (say, example.com) to a derived domain (say, hosting.example.net) using technologies such as DNS SRV records [RFC2782] . If such delegation is not done in a secure manner, then the domain name association cannot be authenticated.
Terminology
This document inherits XMPP terminology from [RFC6120] and [XEP-0220], DNS terminology from [RFC1034] , [RFC1035] , [RFC2782] and [RFC4033] , and security terminology from [RFC4949] and [RFC5280] . The terms "source domain", "derived domain", "reference identity", and "presented identity" are used as defined in the "CertID" specification [RFC6125] .
Client-to-Server (C2S) DNA
The client-to-server case is much simpler than the server-to-server case (the client does not assert a domain name, only the server's domain name needs to be verified, etc.). Therefore we describe it first to help the reader understand domain name associations in XMPP.
C2S Flow
The following flow chart illustrates the protocol flow for establishing a domain name association for an XML stream from a client to a server.
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C2S Description
The simplified order of events (see [RFC6120] for details) in establishing an XML stream from a client (user@a.exmaple) to a server (a.example) is as follows:
1. The client resolves the DNS domain name a.example.
2. The client opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address.
3. The client sends an initial stream header to the server.
<stream:stream from='user@a.example' to='a.example'> 4. The server sends a response stream header to the client, asserting that it is a.example: <stream:stream from='a.example' to='user@a.example'> 5. The parties attempt TLS negotiation, during which the XMPP server (acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that it is a.example.
6. The client checks the PKIX certificate that the server provided; if the proof is consistent with the XMPP profile of the matching rules from [RFC6125] , the client accepts that there is a strong domain name association between its stream to the server and the DNS domain name of the server.
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The server-to-server case is much more complex than the client-toserver case, and involves checking of domain name associations in both directions along with other "wrinkles" described in the following sections.
S2S Flow Chart
The following flow chart illustrates the protocol flow for establishing domain name associations between Server 1 and Server 2, as described in the remaining sections of this document. 
A Simple S2S Scenario
To illustrate the problem, consider the simplified order of events (see [RFC6120] for details) in establishing an XML stream between Server 1 (a.example) and Server 2 (b.example): o The server administrators are running their own XMPP servers, rather than using hosting services.
Let's consider each of these "wrinkles" in turn.
One-Way Authentication
If Server 1 does not present its PKIX certificate during TLS negotiation (perhaps because it wishes to verify the identity of Server 2 before presenting its own credentials), Server 2 is unable to mutually authenticate Server 1. Therefore, Server 2 needs to negotiate and authenticate a stream to Server 1, just as Server 1 has done: 
Alternative Prooftypes
The foregoing protocol flows assumed that domain name associations were proved using the standard PKI prooftype specified in [RFC6120]: that is, the server's proof consists of a PKIX certificate that is checked according to the XMPP profile [RFC6120] of the matching rules from [RFC6125] , the client's verification material is obtained out of band in the form of a trusted root, and secure DNS is not necessary.
However, sometimes XMPP server administrators are unable or unwilling to obtain valid PKIX certificates for their servers. As one example, a certificate authority (CA) might try to send email messages to authoritative mailbox names [RFC2142], but the administrator of a subsidiary service such as im.cs.podunk.example can't receive email sent to mailto:hostmaster@podunk.example. As another example, a hosting provider such as hosting.example.net might not want to take on the liability of holding the certificate and private key for a tenant such as example.com (or the tenant might not want the hosting provider to hold its certificate and private key). In these circumstances, prooftypes other than PKIX are desirable. As described below, two alternatives have been defined so far: DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) and and PKIX Over Secure HTTP (POSH).
DANE
In the DANE prooftype, the server's proof consists of a PKIX certificate that is compared as an exact match or a hash of either the SubjectPublicKeyInfo or the full certificate, and the client's verification material is obtained via secure DNS. Secure connections with multi-tenancy can work using the PKIX prooftype on a small scale if the provider itself wishes to host several domains (e.g., several related domains such as jabberde.example and jabber-ch.example). However, in practice the security of multi-tenancy has been found to be unwieldy when the provider hosts large numbers of XMPP services on behalf of multiple tenants. Typically there are two main reasons for this state of affairs: the service provider (say, hosting.example.net) wishes to limit its liability and therefore does not wish to hold the certificate and private key for the tenant (say, example.com) and the tenant wishes to improve the security of the service and therefore does not wish to share its certificate and private key with service provider. As a result, server-to-server communications to example.com go unencrypted or the communications are TLS-encrypted but the certificates are not checked (which is functionally equivalent to a connection using an anonymous key exchange). This is also true of client-to-server communications, forcing end users to override certificate warnings or configure their clients to accept certificates for hosting.example.net instead of example.com. The fundamental problem here is that if DNSSEC is not used then the act of delegation via DNS SRV records is inherently insecure.
The specification for use of SRV and MX records with DANE [I-D.ietf-dane-srv] explains how to use DNSSEC for secure delegation
